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Abstract 
The paper offers a critical literature review of the debate surrounding the globalization-
poverty nexus, focusing on channels and linkages through which globalization affects 
the poor. After introducing four different concepts used to measure trends in world 
income inequality, it examines first the ‘growth’ conduit through which globalization 
affects poverty. Treating inequality as the explicit filter between growth and poverty 
reduction, the causal chain of openness-growth-inequality-poverty is scrutinized, link by 
link. The paper then moves on to examine other channels in the globalization-poverty 
nexus that operate through changes in relative factor and good prices, factor 
movements, the nature of technological change and diffusion, the impact of 
globalization on volatility and vulnerability, the worldwide flow of information, global 
disinflation, and institutions, respectively. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
strategic policy issues within the context of the globalization debate. 
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Over the recent decades, the world economy has experienced not only a quantitative 
leap in the volume and value of international trade and financial transactions, but a 
qualitative transformation in the way residents of different nation-states interact with 
each other. National economies are increasingly linked through international markets 
for products and factor, leading to increased cross-border flows of goods, capital, 
labour, and through flows of information, technology and management knowhow. 
This process, popularly referred to as the process of globalization is one of the most 
critical developments affecting the evolution of national economies. Globalization 
offers participating countries new opportunities for accelerating growth and 
development but, at the same time, it also poses challenges to, and imposes 
constraints on policymakers in the management of national, regional and global 
economic systems. While the opportunities offered by globalization can be large, a 
question is often raised as to whether the actual distribution of gains is fair, in 
particular, whether the poor benefit less than proportionately from globalization—and 
could under some circumstances actually be hurt by it. 
The risks and costs brought about by globalization can be significant for fragile 
developing economies and the world’s poor. The downside of globalization is most 
vividly epitomized at times of periodical global financial and economic crises. The 
costs of the repeated crises associated with economic and financial globalization 
appear to have been borne overwhelmingly by the developing world, and often 
disproportionately so by the poor who are the most vulnerable. On the other hand, 
benefits from globalization in booming times are not necessarily shared widely and 
equally in the global community.  
The fear that the poor have been by-passed or actually hurt by globalization was 
highlighted by the finding from a number of studies, emerging in the last half dozen 
years, which explicitly examined the trend of world income distribution as it evolved 
during the heyday of the globalization era. Many of these studies point towards an 
increasing inequality in the world income distribution and limited—if not a lack of—
convergence among participating national economies and across regions as 
globalization has proceeded. Concern about inequality trends is relevant to the extent 
that the latter may affect growth and thereby poverty alleviation in the future. 
Inequality acts as a filter between growth and poverty.1  
Inequality is also relevant to the measurement of poverty, if the relative definition of 
poverty is used rather than the absolute definition of poverty. While absolute poverty 
is defined in reference to a poverty line that has a fixed purchasing power determined 
so as to cover basic needs, relative poverty is determined as a fixed proportion of the 
mean income of population (Bourguignon 2004).  
                                                 
1  Wealth (asset) inequality does matter for poverty outcome as much as income inequality. Since 
wealth and income tend to be correlated among individuals, these two types of inequality are clearly  
interrelated. Due to the paucity of data on asset distribution, however, most empirical studies are 
limited to and focus on income inequality.  
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Practically all estimates of poverty are based on absolute poverty rather than relative 
poverty lines. The most recent estimate based on household surveys (Chen and 
Ravallion 2004) suggests that if one uses a poverty line of PPP adjusted US$1 per day 
as a cutoff line, there were 390 million fewer people living in poverty in 2001 than in 
1980. The number of poor fell from 1.5 billion in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001, and the 
share of the population of the developing countries living below US$1 per day 
declined from 40 per cent to 21 per cent. However, this study also shows that this 
progress on poverty reduction was mainly achieved by the substantial reduction of the 
poor in China (400 million fewer people were poor in China in 2001). Their estimate 
also indicates that the absolute number of the poor has fallen only in Asia and risen 
elsewhere and the total number of people living under US$2 per day actually 
increased worldwide. In particular, poverty has increased significantly in Africa in 
terms of poverty incidence as well as the depth of poverty.2   
Though any trend in poverty and income inequality observed so far cannot be 
exclusively or even mainly attributed to the globalization effect as such, without 
rigorous analyses, these various estimates, even the most optimistic ones, cannot 
dismiss the concerns raised that the globalization process, as it has proceeded so far, 
may have had adverse effects on poverty and income distribution.3 These concerns 
have generated a passionate debate worldwide as well as a powerful anti-globalization 
movement. 
The extent of controversy surrounding this debate reflects the fact that globalization is 
not a process proceeding neutrally in a policy vacuum, but a policy-induced 
condition.4 Globalization is not purely driven by new technological innovations and 
progress or by ‘neutral’ market forces and other inescapable sociopolitical forces, as 
often depicted in popular writings.5 In particular, the contemporary phase of 
globalization is, to a certain extent, an outcome emerging from the global 
consolidation and diffusion of the economic policy paradigm, which emphasizes 
benefits and positive features of the liberalized policy regime. In this paradigm, trade 
and financial liberalization is seen, along other market-based institutional reforms 
such as privatization, legal and other regulatory systems, as the sine qua non of a 
successful integration into a globalizing world economy. This kind of position with a 
particular ideological stance might be questioned in the context of the fiercely 
                                                 
2  See Wade (2002) and Deaton (2001, 2002) for critical discussions of the World Bank’s estimates of 
global poverty and inequality used in these studies.  
3  See also Culpeper (2002) for a recent critical literature review of the effect of globalization on 
inequality, in which a set of triangular relationships between globalization, growth and inequality is 
systematically discussed. 
4  See Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004) for an extensive discussion on this policy induced 
condition.  
5  Helleiner (2001) emphasizes the need to distinguish two different phenomena associated with the 
term ‘globalization’. Whilst the first is referred to as the shrinkage in space and in time that the 
world has experienced as a consequence of technological revolutions in transport, communications 
and information processing, the second usage points to policy choices and external liberalization  
involving political, economic and social choices. As he notes, despite this clear distinction, the 
recent association of external liberalization policies with the technology-driven fact of globalization 
has contributed to the terminological confusion.  
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contested debate on the appropriate roles of markets versus states. Indeed, in this 
regard, the recent discussion over the effects of globalization on poverty mirrors very 
much the earlier controversy over the appropriateness of structural adjustment 
programmes as a development strategy for low-income countries and the poor in 
particular.  
Cornia (2000) argues, for example, that growing polarization among countries has 
been accompanied by a surge in inequality within most nations, where growth and 
poverty alleviation have suffered substantially. He suggests that the rising trend in 
inequality in recent decades cannot be explained by the ‘traditional causes of 
inequality’ (i.e., those responsible for income inequality in the 1950s-70s), which 
include high concentration of land and other assets, dominance of natural resources 
and associated rents, unequal access to education, and urban bias.  
While noting that these traditional conditions remain important factors for cross-
country differences in inequality, Cornia argues that the increased global inequality in 
recent decades is attributable more directly to the contemporary globalization effects, 
i.e., the nature of technological changes and policy reform measures such as frequent 
application of deflation policy under stabilization-cum-adjustment; trade 
liberalization; the rise of financial rents following financial liberalization and 
privatization; changes in labour institutions; and erosion of the redistributive role of 
the state.6  
However, despite the utmost importance of understanding the globalization-poverty 
nexus, the precise nature of the various mechanisms, whereby the ongoing process of 
globalization has altered the pattern of income distribution and the conditions facing 
the world’s poor is yet to be carefully analysed. As discussed below, the 
globalization-poverty relationship is complex and heterogeneous, involving 
multifaceted channels. It is highly probable that globalization-poverty relationships 
may be nonlinear in many aspects, involving several thresholds effects. Indeed, each 
subset of links embedded in the globalization (openness)-growth-income distribution-
poverty nexus can be contentious and controversial. Besides the ‘growth’ effects of 
globalization on poverty (i.e., the effects of globalization on poverty filtered through 
economic growth), globalization/integration is known to directly create winners and 
losers, affecting both vertical and horizontal inequalities (Ravallion 2004a). Because 
these multifaceted channels interact dynamically over space and time, the net effects 
of globalization on the poor can only be judged on the basis of ‘context-specific’ 
empirical studies. 
While a number of studies have been conducted to investigate the globalization-
poverty relationships through cross-country regressions, a deeper insight into this 
critical nexus cannot be obtained by regression studies alone, as it requires detailed 
empirical research in a country- and region-specific context.7 Cross-country studies 
                                                 
6  See Culpeper (2002) for further discussion of the effect of economic liberalization policies on 
income distribution and the poor. 
7  See Reimer (2002) for a literature survey of the poverty impacts of trade liberalization in 
developing countries. In his survey, he classifies empirical studies into four methodological 
categories: cross-country regression, partial-equilibrium/cost of living analysis, general equilibrium 
simulation and micro-macro synthesis.  
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require precise measurements and definition of the two key concepts—globalization 
and poverty—and have been criticized on technical (econometric) grounds. Both 
concepts are multidimensional, and not easily captured in a composite index to be 
used in a meaningful manner in cross-country, comparative studies. Indeed, only 
detailed case studies are able to delineate the role of path dependence of multiple 
factors such as resource endowments, trade and production structures, policies, and 
institutions. Such research, if carefully conducted, should yield high dividends in 
identifying appropriate policy responses to globalization in relation to the overriding 
policy objective of poverty reduction.  
This paper aims at providing a critical literature review of the debate surrounding the 
globalization-poverty nexus, focusing on channels and linkages through which 
globalization affects the poor. These various channels can be compared to rivers and 
canals flowing into a common sea or lake. Some of these rivers may be muddy and 
even polluted, others may be crystal clear. The resulting quality of the lake water 
depends on how these various flows combine. Similarly, with some stretch of the 
imagination, the ultimate net effects of the different globalization-poverty channels 
depend on their combined individual effects 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we first introduce four different 
concepts used to measure trends in world income inequality, which are relevant for 
our discussion on the globalization-poverty nexus. In section 3, we examine the 
‘growth’ conduit through which globalization affects poverty, i.e. the growth channel. 
In section 4, we discuss other channels in the globalization-poverty nexus, operating 
through changes in relative factor and good prices, factor movements, the nature of 
technological change and diffusion, the impact of globalization on volatility and 
vulnerability, the worldwide flow of information, global disinflation, and institutions, 
respectively. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of strategic policy issues within 
the context of the globalization debate. 
2  Concepts of world income inequality  
An important issue that needs to be addressed at the outset, is what is meant by 
‘inequality’ in the globalization debate. At least four different concepts (types) of 
income inequality can be identified.8 
—  The first concept measures differences in mean incomes between countries 
(or regions). There is no population weighting and every country counts the 
same. This concept is useful in determining the extent of convergence or 
divergence among countries or regions.  
—  The second concept takes mean national (or regional) incomes but weights 
them by the population of the countries (regions). In this case the resulting 
income distributions will be strongly affected by large countries (e.g., China 
and India) and regions.  
                                                 
8  The first three concepts listed here were defined by Milanovic (2004).  
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—  The third concept measures interpersonal inequality at the global, national or 
regional level, respectively. At the global level, this concept yields the 
world’s income distribution. 
—  A fourth concept is that of vertical and horizontal inequality. While vertical 
inequality refers to inequality among individuals at different levels of the 
income pyramid, horizontal inequality refers to inequality among individuals 
within the same broad income or socioeconomic class.  
A crucial question is whether the worldwide income distribution has become more or 
less even during the recent globalization era. According to concept 1 (national GDPs 
per capita with each country weighed equally) there has been an almost continuous 
and sharply rising divergence over the last 50 years with the Gini coefficient rising 
from around 0.43 in 1950 to 0.53 in 2000. On the other hand, based on concept 2 
(with each country’s mean income weighed by population size), worldwide income 
distribution has become significantly more even with the qualification that this trend 
is totally driven by China. Hence, estimates of ‘between-country’ inequality vary 
widely, depending on whether estimation is made on the basis of using country-
weights (concept 1) or population-weights (concept 2).9 Note that both of these 
concepts ignore entirely the distribution of income within countries, as well as any 
change over time in those intracountry distributions. 
The third concept captures inequality across individuals of the world as it includes the 
‘within-country’ distributions. In this sense, it is the best measure of world income 
inequality and its evolution over time. The various attempts to measure this concept 
are in general agreement that worldwide inequality is very high and rose slightly up to 
the early nineties before falling marginally. The one exception is the study by 
Sala-i-Martin that appears to suffer from methodological flaws (Milanovic 2002a).10 
While globalization could alter both vertical and horizontal inequality (concept 4), as 
Ravallion (2004a) argues, globalization may affect horizontal inequality particularly 
adversely by producing winners and losers among broadly similar groups. But clearly, 
class conflicts could result from vertical inequality. For example, a structural 
adjustment and trade liberalization programme could lead to higher food prices in a 
developing country, benefiting the farmers who are net sellers of food, while 
agricultural workers (the landless) who are net purchasers of food would be 
negatively affected by the reform. 
Williamson (2002) and Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) observe that over the past 
two centuries, the diverging trend of world income has been mainly driven by the rise 
of between-country inequality rather than by the rise of within-country inequality.   
                                                 
9  Estimates with country-weights take each country as one observation, while those with population 
weights give people equal weights. The merits and demerits of using either method are discussed in 
detail in Ravallion (2004). He favours some hybrid weighting scheme as the best way of analysing 
between-country inequality. 
10 Sala-i-Martin uses national quintile distributions assuming no variance within quintiles and 
ignoring the increased income inequality in most of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism—
among other arbitrary assumptions (Milanovic 2002a).    
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Since critics of globalization are often more concerned about the policy effects of 
globalization on the widening gap between rich countries and poor countries, greater 
attention in the debate has been given to the trend in the country-weighted between-
country component of world inequality (concept 1). Indeed, according to this 
measure, between-country inequality has continued to increase over the last four 
decades, while within-country inequality has also steadily risen since the 1970s, 
reversing the early falling  trend in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
convergence debate surrounding this concept of world inequality is discussed in 
section 5.  
3  The growth channel in the openness-growth-inequality-poverty nexus  
Policies of openness through liberalization of trade and investment regimes, and 
capital movements have been advocated worldwide for their growth and welfare- 
enhancing effects on the basis of the propositions embedded in the wellknown 
economic theories of international trade and investment (i.e. the Ricardian 
comparative advantage theory, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, the new trade 
theories à la Krugman, or the model of intertemporal international borrowing/lending 
or portfolio allocation models). In these models, the main growth-enhancing effects of 
openness are assumed to filter through: (i) static efficiency gains associated with 
improved resource allocation for national economies as well as for the world economy 
due to increased specialization; (ii) dynamic efficiency gains from such factors as 
economies of scale, diffusion of information, technology transfers, knowledge 
spillover effects as well as intertemporal trade gains from cross-border 
borrowing/lending for increased investment and consumption smoothing and portfolio 
risk diversification. 
In order to analyse and understand the impact of openness on poverty, the causal 
chain openness-growth-inequality-poverty has to be scrutinized link by link. 
3.1  The openness-growth link 
The first link of the chain is from openness to growth. The main manifestation of 
openness is through trade and capital movement liberalization which in turn is 
presumed to affect growth directly through three subchannels: exports, imports and 
capital inflows. Trade liberalization policies encourage exports which benefit export 
industries and contribute to GDP growth. Although this link is relatively transparent, 
one issue still debated in the literature is the direction of causality. Do exports 
influence growth or does growth influence exports or are they interlinked into a 
virtuous circle? Using an instrumental approach, Frankel and Romer (1999) make a 
rather convincing case that trade influences growth both by increasing human and 
physical capital and by boosting total factor productivity growth. 
A second subchannel links increased imports to growth. A country that switches from 
a regime of import substitution to one of trade liberalization will, in the short run, hurt 
the previously protected domestic industries, and suffer from a fall in fiscal revenues 
as a result of lower tariffs. However, the initial negative consequences on output are  
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likely to be more than compensated through a more efficient allocation of resources 
and benefits of competition, leading to a higher growth path. Successful cases of trade 
liberalization leading to growth are usually found when import liberalization is 
preceded by, or implemented in tandem with, export promotion policy and other 
measures to strengthen the technological capability of domestic producers, as was 
observed in the Asian NICs. 
The third subchannel operates through the impact of foreign investment (FDI) and 
portfolio and other capital flows on domestic output and growth. If FDI takes the form 
of ‘greenfield’ investment as opposed to investment through merger and acquisition, 
much of the capital inflow from transnational corporations (TNCs) tends to be 
converted directly into factories producing new products. However, the transfer of 
technology, skills and management knowhow that is assumed to accompany FDI is 
not necessarily automatic or guaranteed. Further, the postulated positive effects of 
portfolio and other capital flows (hot money) on growth have been questioned 
increasingly in recent years. The recent IMF study (Prasad et al. 2003) acknowledges 
that it is difficult to establish a strong positive causal relationship between financial 
globalization and economic growth.11 Furthermore these short-term capital flows 
contribute to the increased vulnerability to external shocks of the recipient developing 
countries. 
A large number of empirical studies based on cross-country regressions have been 
conducted to show the beneficial effects of an open economy regime on growth, e.g., 
Dollar (1992); Sachs and Warner (1995); Dollar and Kraay (2001a, 2001b).12 
However, the validity of these empirical exercises has been contested on technical 
grounds by many researchers.13 In a recent comprehensive critical analysis of the 
various studies on the relationship between trade and growth, Cline (2004: 248) 
concludes that ‘overall it would seem that the weight of the empirical evidence is on 
the side of those who judge that more open trade policies lead to better growth 
performance’. It is worth noting here, however, that the positive openness-growth link 
is neither automatically guaranteed nor universally observable, as is discussed in 
detail in section 5. 
3.2 The  growth-inequality  interrelationship 
The second link in the causal chain from openness to poverty is the interrelationship 
between growth and inequality. There are two contradictory theoretical strands 
relating income- and wealth-inequality to growth. The classical approach best 
reflected by Kaldor argues that a higher marginal propensity among the rich to save 
than among the poor implies that a higher degree of initial income inequality will 
yield higher aggregate savings, capital accumulation and growth. Additional 
                                                 
11 See Nissanke and Stein (2003) for a critical view on the effect of financial globalization on 
economic growth in emerging market economies. 
12 See World Bank (2002) for a summary of these cross-country studies on the openness-growth link.  
13 See Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) for an excellent critical assessment of these cross-sectional 
studies.  
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arguments in favour of the growth-enhancing effect of inequality are based on the 
existence of investment indivisibilities and incentive effects. 
The contrasting new political economy theories linking greater inequality to reduced 
growth operate through a number of subchannels shown on Figure 1, which is adapted 
from Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002). These subchannels are, respectively: 
(i) unproductive rent-seeking activities that reduce the security of property; (ii) the 
diffusion of political and social instability leading to greater uncertainty and lower 
investment; (iii) redistributive policies encouraged by income inequality that impose 
disincentives on the rich to invest and accumulate resources; (iv) imperfect credit 
markets resulting in underinvestment by the poor, particularly in human capital; and 
(v) a relatively small income share accruing to the middle class—implying greater 
inequality—has a strong positive effect on fertility, and this, in turn, has a significant 
and negative impact on growth. 
Figure 1 
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Greater distortion
LOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH
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HIGH INITIAL INEQUALTIY OF INCOME
 
Sources: (1)  Benhabib and Rustichini (1991); Keefer and Knack (2000); 
  (2)   Alesina and Perotti (1994); 
  (3)   Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Bertola (1993); Persson and Tabellini (1991); 
  (4)  Banerjee and Newman (1993); Aghion and Bolton (1997); 
 (5)  Perotti  (1996). 
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Some additional indirect paths (and more circuitous routes) through which inequality 
ultimately affects growth are likely to exist. Wide income and wealth disparities can 
impact on education, health and crime, respectively, through such manifestations as 
underinvestment in human capital, malnutrition leading to low worker productivity 
and stress and anxiety, respectively. In turn these manifestations may contribute to 
lower long-term growth. 
The rejection of the Kuznets hypothesis of the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between growth and inequality (as per capita income increases) by a number of 
empirical studies provided much impetus to the new political economy literature 
(discussed above) that postulates that high initial inequality is detrimental to 
economic growth.14 The proponents of this approach, while rejecting the immutability 
of the Kuznets curve, argue that growth patterns yielding more inequality in the 
income distribution would, in turn, engender lower future growth paths. Although 
country-specific evidence is quite limited and might not be generalizable to other 
settings, a recent study of the dynamics of inequality and growth in rural China based 
on the growth experience of villages finds a robust statistically significant evidence 
that inequality reduces growth (Benjamin, Brandt and Giles 2004). The authors 
suggest that the mechanism by which inequality exerts its negative effect was through 
its tilting of village economic activity away from higher growth nonagricultural 
development towards agriculture, thereby impeding structural transformation into 
nonagricultural activities. 
In the light of the new literature that emphasizes the impact of inequality on 
incentives, social conflicts, transaction costs and property rights, the possible link 
between growth and poverty is examined in recent UNU-WIDER studies (Cornia 
2000 and Addison and Cornia 2001). These studies argue that: (i) there is a concave 
relationship between inequality and growth: growth can be low at low levels of 
inequality due to disincentive effects and low at high levels of inequality through 
depressing effects on private investment caused by social conflicts; (ii) in this concave 
growth-inequality relationship, there exists a ‘growth-invariant efficient inequality’ 
range.15 Given this growth-inequality relationship, these studies suggest that any 
country that intends to maximize poverty reduction should choose the lowest level of 
inequality within the broadly growth-invariant, efficient inequality range.  
3.3  The inequality-poverty link via future growth 
Since inequality is supposed to affect future growth and the future growth path, it also 
influences poverty. The UNU-WIDER volume cited above (Cornia 2004) concludes 
that the widespread increase in inequality has been detrimental to the objective of 
poverty reduction, because large rises in inequality have stifled growth, and because 
poverty, at any given growth rate of GDP, falls less rapidly in the case of a more 
unequal distribution than in the case of a more equitable one. Thus, in the analytical 
framework used to examine the inequality-growth-poverty relationship reviewed 
                                                 
14 See Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) for a comprehensive review of this new political economy 
literature on the subject. 
15 For an illustration of this growth-inequality relationship, see Figure 2 in Addison and Cornia (2001)  
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above, the UNU-WIDER study clearly indicates that high inequality tends to reduce 
growth. The obvious policy implication following from the above causal sequence is 
that successful poverty alleviation depends not only on favourable changes in average 
GDP per capita growth but also on favourable changes in income inequality. 
The conclusions drawn from the UNU-WIDER study challenge the dominant 
mainstream views derived from a number of World Bank studies such as Deininger 
and Squire (1996); Li, Squire and Zou (1998); Dollar and Kraay (2001a, 2001b). 
These conventional views argue that: (i) the ‘within-country distributive impact’ of 
globalization-cum-liberalization is on the whole neutral; (ii) the long-term distribution 
is broadly stable; (iii) there is no clear association between inequality and growth and 
growth is distribution neutral; hence growth is the only realistic option. For example, 
Dollar-Kraay (2002a, 2002b) argue that ‘since the share of income going to the poor 
does not change on average with growth, the poor benefit from growth’, and ‘trade is 
good for growth and growth is good for the poor’.16 They estimate that the average 
growth elasticity of poverty reduction ranges from 0.6 per cent to 3.5 per cent.17 
However, the methodology used in yielding these results has since then been 
challenged. Ravallion (2002) argues, for example, that average neutrality found in the 
Dollar-Kraay study and other studies is not inconsistent with strong distributional 
effects at the country level. He concurs with Cornia’s position, reaffirming that a 
critical question is whether or not inequality is an impediment to poverty-reducing 
growth, or in other words, whether high inequality attenuates the growth elasticity of 
poverty. His analysis confirms that the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth is 
found to decline with the extent of inequality.  
There is probably no greater fundamental issue in economic development than a better 
understanding of the mechanisms through which growth affects poverty. Foster and 
Szekely capture the heart of the debate between two alternative approaches and 
models of development: 
one model emphasizes growth and efficiency under the idea that they 
eventually, if not immediately, improve the standard of living of the 
population at large, including the poor; the alternative model stresses that the 
state must play an active role in determining where the benefits of 
development end up, since it is not clear that the poor will benefit 
automatically (Foster and Szekely 2000: 59).  
While it is axiomatic that growth is a necessary condition for poverty alleviation, the 
key questions are how the impact and the magnitude of growth on poverty reduction 
can actually be fully ascertained and measured; and what is the optimal degree of 
                                                 
16 Dollar (2002) further reaffirms the strong positive causality from integration through growth to 
poverty reduction on the basis of the experiences of five countries (Bangladesh, India, Uganda, 
Vietnam and China) during the period 1992-98.   
17 An early study by Ravallion and Chen (1997) estimates that based on a sample of developing 
countries, the growth elasticity of poverty on average, as measured by the headcount ratio (the 
proportion of people living below the conventional US$1 a day poverty line) is around 3. 
Bourguignon (2002) reports an average growth elasticity of poverty of 1.6.    
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active state intervention to reduce poverty without sacrificing (or with a minimum 
loss of) efficiency.  
An inherent limitation of poverty measures is that they totally ignore the state of the 
income distribution above the poverty line.18 An aggregate poverty measure is 
essentially a welfare function in which the poor receive all the weight and the 
non-poor receive no weight (Kakwani, Prakasah and Son 2000). Ideally, analysts 
would like to have access to a measure, spanning the whole income distribution, that 
combines poverty and inequality in a relatively non-arbitrary manner. Clearly, 
truncating income distribution at the poverty line is arbitrary and leads to a loss of 
information by failing to consider the distribution of income above the poverty line. 
Foster and Szekely (2000) quite cogently raise the question, ‘Why should an income 
slightly higher (than the poverty line) be ignored, just because it is above the arbitrary 
cutoff being employed?’ 
They proceed to develop a methodology where the measurement of poverty is 
sensitive to the state of income distribution and includes a weighting scheme that is 
continuous in which the non-poor also receive positive weight which may be made as 
small as one wishes. It is based on Atkinson’s (1970) family of ‘equally distributed 
equivalent income’ functions called general means. For different values of the 
parameter α, more weight is placed on higher incomes (for higher parameter values) 
and more weight on lower incomes (at lower parameter values). Based on 144 
household surveys from 20 countries over the last 25 years, Foster and Szekely show 
that the growth elasticity of the general means can vary from 1.08 to a very low 0.22, 
depending on the choice of α. They conclude that: 
the positive value of the elasticity indicates that growth is good for the poor. 
However, it seems that it is even better for other sectors of society. This 
suggests a role for additional policies aimed specifically at guaranteeing that 
the poor share the benefits of development more proportionally (Foster and 
Szekely 2000: 69). 
Indeed, despite the opposite inferences made by mainstream economists on the basis 
of cross-country regression analyses,19 it has been increasingly recognized that the 
pattern of economic growth and development rather than the rate of growth per se 
may have significant effects on a country’s income distribution and poverty profile. 
This issue has led to a debate on what constitutes pro-poor growth.20 
                                                 
18 This and the following paragraphs are based on Thorbecke (2004). 
19 While Berg and Kruger (2002) present a recent survey of mainstream literature on this topic, there 
have emerged many studies critical of the methodology used to establish these propositions (e.g., 
Galbraith and Kum 2002; Bourguignon 2002).   
20 Culpeper (2002) notes, however, that the World Bank’s strategy of ‘pro-poor growth’ usually 
consists simply of: (i) growth-oriented economic policies à la the Washington consensus; (ii) social 
investments in health and education; (iii) social safety nets that cannot take advantage of new 
opportunities created by economic growth. Indeed, these three components constitute the strategy 
adopted in the HIPC Initiatives so far.  
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3.4  Debate on pro-poor growth 
DFID (2004) notes that there are two competing approaches to defining what 
constitutes pro-poor growth: an absolute and a relative concept. The absolute concept 
is associated with the work by Ravallion (2004b). Focusing on the rate of change in 
absolute poverty, he defines pro-poor growth as any growth in mean income that 
benefits the poor in absolute terms. According to this definition, any increase in GDP 
that reduces poverty measured by some agreed indicators is pro-poor growth, even if 
it is accompanied by a worsening income distribution. In contrast, the relative concept 
places much more emphasis on the distributional effect of growth, i.e. changes in 
inequality during the growth process. For example, Kakwani and Pernia (2000) 
consider growth as pro-poor if the distributional shifts accompanying growth favour 
the poor proportionately more than the non-poor.  
As Osmani (2004) notes, what matters most for the relative concept is the nature and 
pattern of growth, whereas the absolute concept captures the effect of the totality of 
the growth process on poverty. Seen in this light, both concepts are useful for 
policymakers in tackling the issue of poverty reduction, although it is difficult for 
some analysts to accept as pro-poor growth a situation where, for example a 10 per 
cent aggregate GDP growth rate would reduce the incidence of poverty by only 1 per 
cent.21 Recognizing this point, Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2004) propose a better 
measure of pro-poor growth, using the concept of the ‘poverty equivalent growth rate 
(PEGR)’ which takes into account both the magnitude of growth and how the benefits 
of growth are distributed to the poor and the non-poor.22  
Indeed, the debate on the meaning of pro-poor growth is related to the issue 
underlining the complex triangular relationships among poverty, growth and 
inequality, as discussed above. Taking up this relationship, Bourguignon (2002 and 
2004) notes that first, absolute poverty reduction could be achieved through two 
effects: (i) the growth effect, i.e. the effect of the growth rate of the mean income of 
the population; and (ii) the distribution effect, i.e., the change in the income 
distribution. Second, he emphasizes that these two effects are not independent of each 
other, but dynamically interact over time in a country-specific context, producing 
heterogeneity and nonlinearity in the poverty-growth relationship. More specifically, 
both the growth-elasticity and the inequality-elasticity of poverty are increasing 
functions of the level of development and decreasing functions of the degree of 
relative income inequality.  
Hence, Bourguignon (2004) advances the following three interrelated points:  
i)  Distribution matters for poverty reduction;  
                                                 
21 It is important to note here that irrespective of which concept is used in discussing pro-poor growth, 
what is considered pro-poor critically depends on the choice of standards for poverty measurement, 
in particular, the shape of the distribution around the poverty line and the choice of poverty lines 
(Grinspun 2004).  
22 If PEGR is larger than the actual growth rate, which occurs when the incomes of the poor grow 
more than the average income, then growth is pro-poor; if PEGR is equal or less than the actual 
growth rate, growth is said not to be pro-poor.  
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ii)  Effective redistributive policies may in fact yield a double dividend: they 
reduce poverty today and accelerate poverty reduction in future, as discussed 
above; 
iii)  The real challenge  in establishing a development strategy for reducing 
poverty lies in understanding the interactions between distribution and 
growth.  
Thus, despite the heated debate concerning the definition of pro-poor growth, there 
appears to be general agreement that poverty reduction would require some 
combination of higher growth and a more pro-poor distribution of the gains from 
growth. For Ravallion (2004c), the real issue is not whether growth is pro-poor, but 
how pro-poor it is, which can be measured by a ‘distribution-corrected’ rate of 
growth. Referring to the growth-distribution relationship, Ravallion (2004c) supports 
the points made by Bourguignon above by arguing that ‘while there may well be 
tradeoffs between what is good for growth and good for distribution, but some factors 
that impede growth may also prevent the poor from fully sharing in the opportunities 
unleashed by growth’.23 From this perspective, one could reach a general definition 
acceptable to both sides of the debate, i.e. growth is considered pro-poor if it, in 
addition to reducing poverty, also decreases inequality.  
Now, from a policy perspective, it is important to note that pro-poor growth cannot be 
achieved spontaneously. There is increasing recognition that the postulated ‘trickle 
down’ process often fails to materialize or is too slow to have a significant impact. 
Hence, pro-poor growth requires strong commitments on the part of policymakers to 
adopt pro-poor policies capable of producing and sustaining a distribution-corrected 
growth path.  The exact design of such pro-poor policies depends on initial conditions 
and institutions in country-specific settings.  
4  Other channels in the globalization-inequality-poverty nexus  
Aside from the growth channel discussed above, there are various other channels, 
through which globalization can produce winners and losers, and hence impact upon 
poverty. The globalization channels we examine here are:  
—  Changes in relative product and factor prices;  
—  Differential cross-border factor mobility and associated changes in global 
market and power structures;  
—  The nature of technical progress and the technological diffusion process;  
—  The impact of globalization on volatility and vulnerability; 
—  The impact of globalization on the flow of information; 
—  Globalization and global disinflation; and 
                                                 
23 See Lopez (2004) for the debate on the trade-offs between pro-growth and pro-poor policies.   
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—  Institutions in developed and developing countries that mediate the various 
channels and transmission mechanisms linking globalization to poverty. 
4.1  Changes in relative prices of factors and products  
The income distribution effects induced by a shift in relative product prices in the 
process of the opening up of trade are well-known, as postulated in the 
Samuelson-Stolper theorem of international trade theory. The losers (especially the 
poor residing in either urban or rural area) may be vulnerable to these induced effects 
in addition to changes in absolute and relative prices of wage goods (Williamson 
2002). Thus, globalization can affect poverty directly through relative price changes 
in factor markets and goods markets.  
According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem as applied to the within-country 
inequality, developing countries well-endowed with unskilled labour should 
experience a decline in income inequality through an increased demand for unskilled 
labour, while unskilled labour in developed countries would lose out with an adverse 
effect on equity.24 Rodrik (1997) confirms this income distribution effect for 
industrialized countries in terms of a more elastic demand for unskilled domestic 
labour in the presence of a large international pool of unskilled labour. However, the 
postulated narrowing wage gaps between skilled and unskilled labour have not been 
observed in many developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa. 
Kanbur (1998) explains this disconnect between what theory predicts and the actual 
outcome in terms of segmented factor markets and the time horizon of the analysis, 
suggesting that the benign income distribution effects would eventually materialize on 
the strength of long-run factor mobility.25 Wood (1999) proposes two possible 
explanations for the increased wage disparity in Latin America: (i) the entry into the 
world markets in recent decades of low-income Asian economies, such as China and 
India, with abundant reserves of unskilled labour; and (ii) the nature of new 
technology heavily biased in favour of skilled and educated labour.26 
4.2  Factor mobility  
Globalization winners and losers can be produced through channels other than 
changes in relative product and factor prices which are a main conduit for the income-
distribution effect of trade openness in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-Stolper 
(HOSS) model. For example, unlike in the HOSS world which assumes factor 
                                                 
24 As Culpeper (2002) notes, international trade theories also predict a similar effect of factor mobility 
on inequality. Thus, in theory, we predict that globalization would increase inequality within 
developed countries, but decrease inequality within developing countries. 
25 Many mainstream economists argue that higher unemployment and greater poverty observed 
following trade openness are the direct results of pervasive labour market ‘distortions’ such as 
minimum wage legislation or imperfect labour mobility across sectors induced by these distortions.  
26 Culpeper (2002) notes that technology can be either exogenous (and biased towards factors such as 
capital or skilled labour) or endogenous and responsive to relative factor-abundance.    
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mobility only within a country, cross-border factor mobility has historically been a 
dominant force in the globalization process for many centuries. The highly 
differentiated degree of cross-border factor mobility observed today may be identified 
as another channel of producing winners and losers as a result of globalization.  
In this context, it is of interest to note that income convergence among the globalizing 
countries during the first wave of modern globalization between 1870 and 1914 was 
driven primarily by migration. Sixty million people, including largely unskilled 
workers, migrated from Europe to North America and other parts of the new world 
during that period (Williamson 2002 and World Bank 2002). In contrast, in the 
current phase of globalization, the extent of cross-border mobility differs significantly 
between skilled and unskilled labour. In consequence, as noted by Faini (2001), the 
‘wage equalization’ theorem postulated by the international trade theory is less likely 
to take place through labour migration. 
Furthermore, according to theory, capital seeking higher returns should move to 
capital-scarce developing countries, thereby raising the marginal productivity and 
labour wages in these countries (Easterly 2004). However, in reality capital does not 
flow to developing countries to finance productive investment as much as predicted 
(known as the Lucas paradox). International capital markets in recent decades have 
not acted as an intermediation function between saving supply and investment 
demand on a global scale. Rather, as Obstfeld and Taylor observe 
today’s foreign asset distribution is much more about asset swapping by rich 
countries—diversification—than it is about the accumulation of large 
one-way positions—a critical component of the development process in 
poorer countries in the standard textbook treatments. It is more about 
hedging and risk sharing than it is about long-term finance… (Obstfeld and 
Taylor 2001: 64).  
Indeed, the large discrepancies between gross capital flows and net capital flows 
reflected in countries’ current account positions point to the condition where 
diversification finance far overwhelms development finance in cross-border capital 
transactions.27  
More generally, Culpeper (2002) summarizes several distinctive features of factor 
movements in the current wave of globalization: (i) capital and skilled labour do not 
migrate to poor countries as much as among developed countries; (ii) there is a 
tendency for skilled labour to migrate from developing countries to developed 
countries; (iii) with capital market liberalization, there is a propensity of capital flight 
to developed countries, particularly during periods of crisis or instability. With such 
‘perverse’ movements, he points to the possibility that as globalization proceeds, 
developed countries would see inequality fall, while developing countries would 
experience rising inequality. 
We can indeed expect greater global integration to affect internationally mobile 
factors (skilled labour and capital) differently from those factors that are not—or 
                                                 
27 See Nissanke and Stein (2003) for more discussion on the nature of financial globalization.  
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less—mobile (unskilled labour and land) in both developed and developing countries 
(Rodrik 1997 and Kanbur 1998). In this context, Basu (2003) explains why unskilled 
labour is additionally disadvantaged in the current phase of globalization. He argues 
that while the mobility of unskilled labour is severely restricted and regulated, de 
facto labour mobility has taken place through the increasingly free cross-border 
capital mobility and TNCs’ ability to relocate production sites in response to changes 
in relative labour costs. In fear of driving away TNCs, governments of developing 
countries are less likely to enact regulations to protect and enhance labour rights.28 
Thus as observed over recent decades, the differential factor mobility may profoundly 
affect the functional income distribution between labour and capital. 
4.3  Technological progress and technological diffusion 
The nature of technical progress and of the technological diffusion process can be a 
further channel through which globalization could affect income distribution and 
poverty. Culpeper (2002) suggests that technical change emanates predominantly 
from R&D activities in the developed (industrialized) countries in response to 
conditions typical of their own resource endowment. Hence, technical change tends to 
be labour-saving and skill-biased, and would tend to increase inequalities universally 
in both developed and developing countries. 
Referring to the importance of distinguishing between three categories of labour 
(skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour), Milanovic (2002b) also explains the 
increased wage inequality in low-income countries with the situation in which 
increased globalization, through trade and FDI, has raised the demand for semi-skilled 
labour but not for unskilled labour, as a minimum skill level is required for 
production. Hence, it is the skilled or semi-skilled labour that benefits from 
globalization, while unskilled labour has been increasingly marginalized by it. 
Similarly, Kanbur (1998) adds the technology factor as an explanation for the 
observed increase in skilled-unskilled wage differentials in many developing 
countries, in particular when capital inflow embodying new technology is 
complementary to skilled labour. Thus, he argues that greater openness and 
integration into the world economy will have the benefit of providing access to more 
productive technology, but will widen the gap between skilled and unskilled wages in 
the modern sector and in the economy as a whole. Agénor (2002) also notes that the 
wage disparity widens after trade liberalization and the associated decline in the cost 
of imported technology and capital goods, because there is a high degree of 
substitutability between unskilled labour and capital, in contrast to the high degree of 
complementarity between skilled labour and capital. 
Furthermore, technological diffusion and access to new technology is not universal 
and spontaneous. Hence, global productivity differences may widen over time, which 
                                                 
28 Basu (2003) also notes that due to this de facto labour mobility, labour market policies of 
developing nations have become a matter of major concern in international fora and organizations 
because working conditions in developing countries have effects on employment conditions in 
industrialized nations. Thus, with globalization, he argues, there is a need for international labour 
standards, set preferably by the ILO.  
17 
may increase income inequality. For example, Easterly (2004) argues that in addition 
to differences in factor endowments, productivity differences between countries have 
driven trade and factor flows, and income inequality.29 Indeed, the technological gaps 
between innovating and imitating countries as discussed in Vernon’s product cycle 
model are still a dominant factor in determining global inequality between countries 
in income and wages. 
Arguably, globalization has accelerated the process of privatization, including the 
privatization of research. Nowhere is this trend clearer than in agriculture. The green 
revolution, which was in the public domain, has been replaced by the biotechnological 
revolution which is very much in the private domain. The latter is led by TNCs 
expecting royalty payments for their new products, largely genetically modified (GM) 
seeds.30 A potential issue is whether small farmers in developing countries (e.g., in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) can actually afford to adopt biotechnology and if 
not, what are the consequences for income distribution and poverty. While it is 
probably too early to judge, it has been argued that the concern that risk-averse poor 
farmers cannot afford to purchase the costlier GM seeds does not seem to be 
vindicated by the dramatic takeup of GM cotton in developing countries as soon as it 
is available and seen to be profitable.31 
4.4  Volatility and vulnerability 
Greater openness tends to be associated with greater volatility and economic shocks, 
which affect more severely the vulnerable and poor households, and deepen poverty 
and income inequality (Culpeper 2002). Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) also emphasize 
the effect of trade liberalization on inequality because of the increasing vulnerability 
of unskilled labour through several ‘labour market’ channels. Birdsall (2002) reports 
growing empirical evidence of validating the claim that the poor are hurt 
disproportionately more during contractionary periods than they benefit from 
expansionary periods. Similarly, on the basis of a very extensive survey of the 
empirical literature, Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) conclude that while the 
empirical evidence broadly supports the theoretical proposition that whilst trade 
liberalization will be poverty-alleviating in the long run and on average, it also 
necessarily brings about distributional changes. They point to a lot of evidence that 
                                                 
29 Relative cost advantages arising from technology differences are the basis of understanding the 
trade patterns and aggregate gains from trade in classical Recardian trade theory. Easterly (2004) 
extends this theory to explain the observed income inequality as globalization proceeds. For the 
contemporary version of the Ricardian trade model and possible effects of technological innovation 
in China on global trade flows, see Samuelson (2004).   
30 Concerns and anxieties have been raised  about the effect of GM seeds on health, environment, and 
other conditions affecting our life in the long run. Here, we do not take a particular position in this 
controversy, stating that  it may still be too early to pass definitive judgement . 
31 On the adoption experience in China and India, for example, see Pray et al. (2003).  
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poorer households may be less able than richer ones to protect themselves against 
(short-term) adverse effects, or take advantage of trade liberalization.32 
The Asian financial crisis demonstrated unambiguously the high price poor 
households had to pay during the downturn. Massive capital outflows during the crisis 
combined with tight monetary and fiscal policies mandated by the IMF, led to wide 
currency fluctuations (at one time, the Indonesian rupiah depreciated by 500 per cent) 
and a liquidity crisis that reduced output and employment. Poor households in the 
urban areas, lacking safety nets, suffered disproportionately during the transition 
period before these economies recovered. 
Interestingly, there is some evidence that volatility is negatively correlated with 
growth in developing countries in contrast with developed countries where this 
correlation is positive (Kose, Prasad and Terrones 2004). An implication of this 
finding is that poor countries growing slowly are further burdened by greater 
volatility. 
4.5  Flow of information 
Globalization has contributed to the enormous increase in the flow of information and 
knowledge worldwide. Internet technology and the spread of mass media transmit 
information almost instantaneously. Clearly, this provides enormous potential to 
contribute to the human and technical capital of households in the third world. At this 
stage, an important issue is the design and development of channels through which 
this flow of information is made accessible to poor households in useful form. 
Notwithstanding the major contribution this flow of information can make to speed up 
the development process, there are some downsides. Graham (2004) has argued that 
the increasing flow of information about the living standards of others can result in 
changing reference norms and increased frustration with relative income differences, 
as members of a given socioeconomic or occupational group in a poor country can 
increasingly compare their welfare with similar groups in richer countries.  
Globalization can also increase volatility and insecurity for many cohorts, particularly 
those (such as older people) not well positioned to take advantage of the new 
opportunities offered by the opening up of trade and capital movements. 
4.6  Globalization and global disinflation 
In the last decade, global inflation has dropped from 30 per cent per year to 4 per cent. 
Rogoff (2003) attributes this to a number of factors such as improved central bank 
institutions and practices, improved fiscal policy, and the technological revolution. 
However he emphasizes the role played by the increased level of competition, in both 
                                                 
32 Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) stress that there can be no simple general conclusion about 
the relationship between trade liberalization and poverty and the impact of trade liberalization on 
poverty. The outcome is very much context-specific, dependent on the environment in which it is 
carried out, including the policy design and implementation.  
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product and labour markets, that has resulted from the interaction between increased 
globalization, deregulation, and a decreased role for governments in many economies. 
It would be difficult to argue that this dramatic disinflation channel does not have 
beneficial effects on the poor worldwide. Even the small subsistence farmers who 
tend to be relatively sealed off from the market economy must enjoy certain 
advantages in terms of lower prices for their consumption goods. However, a question 
to be raised is whether the overemphasis on macrostability in some developing 
countries might not have been at the expense of some additional growth. 
4.7 Institutions 
Institutions mediate the various channels and mechanisms through which the 
globalization process affects poverty (Sindzingre 2004). Institutions act as a filter 
intensifying or hindering the positive and negative pass-through between 
globalization and poverty, and can help explain the diversity, heterogeneity and non-
linearity of outcomes. This filtering process operates at the multi-country, country and 
even village level, respectively. International institutions such as the IMF and WTO 
follow their own rules of the game, having often a major impact on poverty outcomes. 
Likewise, institutions that protect agricultural commodities in the developed countries 
can block the channel of exports for the same commodities from the poorest countries 
(largely in Sub-Saharan Africa), thereby preventing them from harvesting the benefits 
of trade openness. At the other extreme there are examples of village-level institutions 
that can protect resident households from environmental degradation and subsequent 
poverty caused by overexploitation of resources (such as forest resources) by TNCs. 
Rodrik (1998a and 1998b) argues cogently that the benefits of trade openness can be 
reaped fully only in countries with effective institutions, in particular institutions that 
can successfully resolve the distributional conflicts stemming from trade openness. 
He also highlights the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in 
explaining comparative economic development experiences (Rodrik 2004 and 2005).  
Indeed, once institutions are defined broadly à la North as ‘the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’, institutional environments are important in 
determining whether the benefits of globalization are harnessed and spread positively 
and evenly, and negative shocks associated with globalization are filtered out through 
safety nets. As Sindzingre (2004) argues, for example, the impact of globalization on 
the poor is intermediated on the one hand by domestic political economy structures 
and institutions such as social polarization, oligarchic structures, and predatory 
regimes that may bias, confiscate or nullify globalization gains for particular groups 
of poor. On the other hand, the positive effects of globalization on growth and poverty 
can be found when institutional conditions are characterized by such elements as 
political participation, social cohesion and management of social conflict arising 
directly from globalization effects. 
At the same time, globalization can bring about changes in institutional environments. 
For example, as globalization proceeds, there may emerge a new set of norms and 
conventions, as well as new standards of transparency, accountability and  
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enforcement of law and accommodation of human rights and civil movements.33 Yet, 
traditional institutions may erode under the pressure of market integration. For 
example, customary land tenure may lose its social security and equity functions 
through the individualization of land rights and land concentration stemming from 
market transactions, especially when combined with demographic pressure. More 
generally, however, institutional changes can be slow and changes tend to work at the 
margin, since ‘institutional change is incremental as a result of the imbededness of 
informal constraints in societies’ (North 1990: 6). 
5  Empirical evidence and policy debate in the globalization-inequality-poverty 
nexus 
5.1  The convergence debate and the importance of strategic integration 
The observed between-country income divergence trend (discussed in section 2) tends 
to bring into question the validity of the income convergence thesis, advanced by 
Sachs and Warner (1995) and others. The thesis postulates that adoption of open trade 
regimes by the poorer economies would lead to a convergence of their incomes 
towards those of the richer nations in the process of globalization. Krugman and 
Venables (1995) also support the convergence thesis, by constructing a model of the 
globalizing world economy. In the latter model, the income levels of countries in the 
core and the periphery would converge in the long-run after an initial period of 
divergence, as trade/transport costs decline over time. Their convergence-time profile 
is essentially driven by the presence of economies of scale and agglomeration effects 
in the initial period, and factor-mobility and relocation of production in the 
subsequent period. The latter course is assumed to take place as a result of 
multinational firms responding to continuous shifts in comparative advantages among 
nations and regions. 
It is, however, abundantly clear that the mere adoption of open trade and investment 
regimes does not guarantee entry of the developing countries into the convergence 
club. Dowrick and DeLong (2001) suggest that (i) openness to the world economy 
does not necessarily promote convergence; (ii) many poor countries that have opened 
their economies since the 1980s have fallen behind, not just relatively but absolutely 
in terms of both income levels and structural development. 
In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the analysis by Kitson and Michie (1995), 
which argues that: 
the benefits of trade do not evenly spread globally and trade may indeed lead 
to persistent divergence in growth, as it could influence economic growth 
through the twin processes depending on the initial conditions of trading 
countries; virtuous cycles of trade-induced growth for stronger nations and 
                                                 
33 However, Sindzingre (2004) suggests that globalization as a set of flows and policies is more likely 
to induce transformation on the aspects of institutions that are already experiencing rapid change, 
e.g., formal political or economic rules, and less likely to affect slow-changing institutions such as 
social norms.  
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vicious cycles of trade-induced decline for weaker nations (Kitson and 
Michie 1995: 5).  
A similar point is made by Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004: 4), who argue that 
‘moves towards a more open and integrated economic space are just likely to 
reinforce as they are to diminish the gaps between developed and developing 
countries’. They suggest that since economies are subject to processes of cumulative 
and circular causation, whether global market forces establish a virtuous circle or 
vicious circle will depend on the initial conditions at the time of exposure and the 
effective design and implementation of policy to manage the integration process. 
Incidentally, it is relevant to note that ‘non-convergence’ can also be observed at the 
interregional level. China is a prime example of a country in which regional 
inequalities increased dramatically under the influence of the globalization process 
that brought about large flows of FDI to the coastal provinces but largely by-passing 
the inland provinces. 
Non-convergence and modes of integration 
Indeed, the conundrum of the persistent ‘non-convergence’ of world income should 
be explicitly addressed in terms of structural features of the global economic 
relationships as they evolved over time and the institutional conditions found in 
participating countries.34 The income convergence trend among nation-states, to the 
extent that it has been observed historically, is likely to be explained more effectively 
by the nature of integration and specialization of sub-groups of countries, rather than 
by the degree of openness of the trade and investment regimes per se, as is often 
claimed. In particular, in the current phase of globalization, developing countries have 
to reach a certain threshold, by undergoing substantial changes in trade and 
production structure, before they experience income convergence. As the World Bank 
study acknowledges: 
successful globalizers’ are those developing countries, which have managed 
to break into global markets for manufactures and services, and reduce 
inequality in this process. It recognizes that for many low-income countries 
and poor people, ‘globalization is not working’ (World Bank 2002: 2).  
Clearly, countries need to have reached the takeoff point before they can take 
advantage of the potential benefits of openness and globalization.  
One of the critical reasons why globalization may not be working for low-income 
developing countries lies in the fact that the effects of international trade on growth 
are critically dependent on the pattern of specialization and integration. By treating 
two sectors symmetrically, the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin trade model (consisting 
of two countries, two sectors and two factors) shows that two countries equally reap 
                                                 
34 See Rodrik (2002, 2004, and 2005) for the debate on the role of developmental state and institutions 
in this particular conjuncture.   
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aggregate gains from trade through efficiency gains.35 In reality, however, the pattern 
of specialization does matter for welfare implications of a trade-induced growth path 
on at least two accounts.  
Two sectors need not be symmetrical, first, through the well-known immiserizing 
effect of trade à la Bhagwati, i.e. the terms-of-trade (TOT) effects. Though many 
dismiss the likelihood of such an effect in a small economy, low-income countries 
dependent on the exports of a limited range of primary commodities face a 
deterioration of TOT, in particular if the ‘fallacy composition effect’ is seriously 
taken into account. In the 1980s and 1990s, many primary commodity exporting 
countries, which implemented structural adjustment programmes, underwent 
simultaneous export drives, leading to depressed prices in many export commodities 
(Nissanke and Ferrarini 2001). In this context, Birdsall (2002) draws attention to the 
fact that measured by the trade-GDP ratio or tariff rates, most commodity-dependent 
countries have not been more reticent than least commodity-dependent countries 
about participating in international trade, but the former group has failed to grow 
(especially after 1980), as they have remained dependent on exports of primary 
commodities. 
Furthermore, two sectors are not necessarily symmetrical on account of dynamic scale 
economies, i.e. dynamic externalities through technological spill-over benefits and the 
accumulation of knowledge capital. As the endogenous growth theory emphasizes, it 
is this factor that largely accounts for diverging growth rates among countries. An 
application of this phenomenon to the trade model implies that a country specializing 
in an industry with a larger positive externality would experience a faster growth rate 
compared with the trading partner that specializes in an industry with a weaker 
externality. Thus, the growth rate of the two trading countries could differ 
considerably, depending on the pattern of specialization.  
If a country follows the Rybczinski line dictated by static comparative advantage with 
given relative resource endowments, the country with an initial comparative 
advantage in ‘non-dynamic’ sectors may end up in a low equilibrium trap. Countries 
that have benefited from globalization and integration—such as those found in East 
Asia—are the ones which have successfully completed the structural transformation 
of the composition of their production and trade structure with continuous upgrading 
of their human skill endowments and technology/knowledge base. Consequently, their 
comparative advantages have evolved over time to maximize the benefit from 
dynamic externalities.  
Seen from this perspective, openness per se is not sufficient to insure that 
development will follow. The internal pattern of growth and forms of integration are 
critical for countries to benefit from globalization-induced growth. It is in this 
conjuncture that the polarization thesis or the international poverty trap thesis, 
advanced by UNCTAD (2002), can be evaluated. The UNCTAD thesis suggests that: 
(i) there is a close association between the incidence of poverty and dependence on 
                                                 
35 This two-sector model of international trade can be easily extended to N-sector model (for example, 
see Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson 1977).  
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exports of primary commodities;36 (ii) this explains the increased poverty and the 
socioeconomic marginalization in the commodity-dependent poorest countries, where 
an interrelated complex relationship between international trade and finance is 
reinforcing the cycle of generalized poverty and economic stagnation; (iii) the current 
form of globalization is tightening—not loosening—this international poverty trap.37 
Indeed, the polarization thesis reminds us of the importance of reaching the takeoff 
stage before countries can benefit from globalization, as discussed. 
Strategic integration into the world economy 
One of the critical issues facing policymakers in low-income developing countries in 
formulating their strategic position towards the globalization process is how to evolve 
their patterns of comparative advantage over time. A strategic position towards 
globalization cannot be equated with a simple fine-tuning of the pace and sequence of 
liberalization measures. Clearly, it is a question concerning the pattern or forms of 
integration. In particular, national development policies should be strategically 
designed in the light of the skewed nature of the on-going process of globalization.  
First, dynamic externalities and rent-rich activities are increasingly concentrated in 
high-skill, knowledge-intensive sectors. In short, the skill- and technology-related 
divide has become wider over recent decades. This trend is reflected in the 
continuously declining terms of trade of less skill-intensive manufactured goods 
relative to high-skill and technology intensive goods (Maizels 1998; Wood 1997). 
Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004) note that the markets for many labour-intensive 
products, consisting increasingly of internationally standard goods, have come to 
resemble those for primary products. 
Second, trade in the current phase of globalization is largely mediated through 
international production with an increasing share of intra-firm trade undertaken by 
TNCs, which command a lion share of global production and marketing networks. 
Considerable asymmetries in market power and access to information, technology and 
other intangible knowledge assets between TNCs on the one hand and local farmers 
and traders in developing countries on the other hand have resulted in a hugely 
skewed distribution of gains from trade. This is reflected in the TNCs’ dominance in 
commodity and value chains of international traded goods, as well as in frequently 
observed conditions such as the sharp decline in real wages in export processing 
zones (Kaplinsky 2002). The benefits of productivity improvements, instead of going 
to the fragmented producers and farmers, are largely appropriated by the TNCs and 
                                                 
36 UNCTAD (2002, 2004) suggests a very close association between the ‘commodity trap’ and the 
‘poverty trap’ (UNCTAD 2004: 46).  
37 Defining a poverty trap as a situation in which poverty has effects that act as the causes of poverty, 
Gore (2003) suggests that poverty traps exist at different levels of aggregation: at the micro 
(household and community) level, the national level and global level. At the global level, a country 
can get stuck in an international poverty trap, where the nature of the international economy and 
institutional structures that govern international relationships are implicated in the processes of 
circular causation of persistent poverty at the household, community and national levels.  
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global supermarket chains that can exploit oligopolistic commodity markets at later 
stages of the value chain (UNCTAD 2004).38  
This uneven distribution of market power points to the need to improve the 
negotiating positions of developing-country governments vis-à-vis TNCs. 
Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2004) emphasize the desirability of adopting policies to 
guide FDI within a national development strategy. In this context, Lall (2002) argues 
for a strategic, targeted approach to FDI, so that FDI could facilitate skill- and 
technology-transfer and generate strong positive productivity spillovers for domestic 
firms. 
Given the observed trends towards inequality both globally and within many nations, 
in order to derive benefits from globalization’s dynamic forces, developing countries 
have to take strategic steps to protect themselves with a long-term vision for 
upgrading their comparative advantages towards high-value added activities by 
climbing the technology ladder. This can be realised by developing technological 
capabilities through learning and adaptation. To succeed, developing-country 
governments should consciously engage in building institutional capacities for 
integration, including a capable nation-state that is ready to take on the enormous 
challenges posed by globalization.  
5.2  The importance of structural transformation 
Threshold effects of globalization 
Now, we turn to the impact of globalization on income distribution and poverty 
incidence within countries. Milanovic’s (2002b) cross-country econometric analysis, 
based on household survey data in 1988 and 1993, suggests that openness worsens 
individual countries’ income distribution before improving it, and that the effect of 
openness on income distribution depends on the country’s initial income level. In his 
view, this is conditioned by the fact that ‘openness helps those with basic and high 
education, but reduces the income share of those with no education’ and ‘it is only 
when basic education becomes the norm even for the poor that openness exert an 
income equalizing effect’. Thus, Milanovic postulates that ‘openness helps income 
distribution chart an inverted U-shaped curve as the income level increases. At low 
income levels, openness is bad for equality: at medium and high income level, it 
promotes equality’ (Milanovic 2002b: 13).39  
                                                 
38 UNCTAD (2004) reports that the value of global retail sales of coffee today is about US$70 billion, 
of which producers receive only US$5.5 billion. 
39 Easterly (2003) also advances the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
inequality and openness, measured as (Exports + Imports)/GDP), which would drive out the usual 
Kuznetz curve between income and inequality, typically found in cross-country empirical studies. 
However, he explains this in terms of the cross-country difference in factor endowments and the 
trade openness: less open economies tend to export mainly natural resource-based commodities that 
are associated with inequality, whilst open economies export labour-intensive manufactures and 
services, whereby inequality diminishes. However, as he admits, his hypothesis is based on a casual 
observation rather than a rigorous analysis.  
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Further, Agénor (2002) discusses a similar inverted U-shape relationship between 
globalization and poverty operating through a ‘relative wage effect’.  Referring to the 
close substitution between imported capital goods and unskilled labour, he reckons 
that the skilled-unskilled wage gap increases initially as a consequence of trade 
liberalization.40 However, he argues that this initial widening in wage differentials 
may lead to investment in human capital, a gradual increase in the supply of skilled 
labour, and a narrowing wage gap over time. Thus, he suggests that there exists a non-
linear Laffer-type relationship between poverty and globalization: at low degrees of 
globalization, globalization does hurt the poor while at higher levels, it leads to a 
decline in poverty. From this perspective, he infers that globalization may hurt the 
poor in some countries not because it went too far but rather because it did not go far 
enough.  
Thus, these studies suggest there may be critical thresholds that must be reached 
before globalization can make a positive contribution to poverty reduction. The non-
linear relationship between globalization and poverty postulated in these studies is 
interesting and worth further investigation. However, policy implications from these 
studies should be drawn very carefully. For example, Agénor’s reasoning behind his 
policy conclusion is based on the assumption that investment in human capital would 
somehow increase automatically with the widening wage differentials across skills. 
Even if such an investment in human capital were to occur, it could take a long time 
before low-income countries would experience a significant reduction in poverty. 
Hence, sizeable public investment in skill upgrading is likely to be a key for ensuring 
such results. Meanwhile, in countries at an early stage of development, i.e. those that 
have not reached the critical threshold, the poor should be protected from negative 
effects of globalization through various institutions of social protection and 
redistributional policies.  
Structural transformation of an agrarian economy 
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that in a world of interdependent evolution, 
openness is a necessary but insufficient condition for development to succeed. All 
countries have to undergo structural transformation throughout the process of 
development. At the outset of the development process a country is predominantly 
agrarian and the economy relatively closed. The majority of output originates in 
agriculture where the bulk of the labour force is employed. A key issue in triggering 
the cumulative growth process at the early phase of development is generating the 
resources required to reach the takeoff point.  
Long before most other developing countries, the East Asian governments understood 
that the major mechanism for obtaining the resources needed for escaping the poverty 
trap and for industrialization was through an intersectoral transfer from agriculture. 
The role of the agricultural sector was to generate a surplus that could finance the 
                                                 
40 In addition, Agénor (2002) refers to a separate output effect, through which trade liberalization may 
have an inverted J-curve effect on poverty. This is because trade liberalization produces at first a 
decline in output and income due to a contraction in import competing industries, which could lead 
to an increase in poverty. However, such a decline is seen as temporary, as output is assumed to 
increase over time with an expansion of exports, which could attenuate poverty.  
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necessary physical infrastructure and pragmatically educated labour force for the 
industrialization process to succeed. 
A lesson learned from the countries that were most successful in achieving both 
growth and equity throughout their development history (e.g., Taiwan and South 
Korea) is that a continuing gross flow of resources should be provided to 
agriculture—irrigation, inputs, research and credit—combined with appropriate 
institutions and price policies to increase this sector’s productivity and potential 
capacity of contributing an even larger flow to the rest of the economy and hence a 
net surplus. Exploiting the agricultural sector too early in the development process—
so typical in Sub-Saharan African and some Latin American countries—short-circuits 
the structural transformation. In short, reaching the takeoff point is a precondition to 
embarking on the next phase of development (industrialization) and taking advantage 
of the potential benefits of openness (Thorbecke and Morrisson 1989).  
The fundamental role of agriculture in reducing poverty has been highlighted within 
the context of China by Ravallion and Chen (2004). They show that the bulk of the 
dramatic poverty alleviation in China occurred before 1980, essentially as the 
consequence of de-collectivizing agriculture, shifting responsibility for farming to 
households and higher food grain procurement prices. They note that when so much 
of the country’s poverty is found in its rural areas, it is not surprising that agricultural 
growth plays an important role in China, as in other developing countries. They are 
more sceptical regarding the score card for trade reform, concluding that:  
While the country’s success in trade reforms may well bring longer term 
gains to the poor … the experience of 1981-2001 does not provide support 
for the view that China’s periods of expanding external trade brought more 
rapid poverty reduction (Ravallion and Chen 2004: 31). 
In the next phase (the post-takeoff phase), successful development calls for the 
expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors with continuous structural and 
technological upgrading. During this potentially high growth phase, the role of the 
government is to maintain macroeconomic stability, overcome possible coordination 
failure and act as an umpire in promoting growth pioneers. Successful countries have 
evolved along the product cycle determined by the path of dynamic comparative 
advantage. They climbed the product ladder one wrung at a time (from simple textiles 
to computer chips), relying on their most abundant factors in each development phase. 
Technological leap-frogging has typically led to failure. The experience of East Asia 
has clearly demonstrated that a careful structural transformation as outlined above 
generates a growth process that is pro-poor. Other key elements of the East Asian 
development model were, in addition to the treatment of agriculture and education in 
the pre-takeoff phase, sound macroeconomic management and stability, and 
openness; the emulation of the US as the technological leader and strengthening intra- 
East and South East Asia connections (Thorbecke and Wan 2004). 
The above analysis applies particularly to countries that have not taken the necessary 
steps to develop their agricultural sector and consequently have not yet reached the 
takeoff point. Many Sub-Saharan countries are prime examples of agricultural 
exploitation leading to agricultural output stagnation and the short-circuiting of the 
structural transformation. The industrialization strategy, based on capturing a surplus  
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from the stagnating agricultural output, is bound to fail and can have devastating 
consequences on poverty. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
The preceding review and critical analysis demonstrate that globalization can affect 
poverty indirectly through the ‘growth effects’ as well as directly through channels 
such as changes in relative goods’ prices in favour of (or against) wage goods, 
changes in relative factor prices induced by trade or factor mobility; the nature of 
technological progress and the technological diffusion process; volatility and 
vulnerability; the nature of the worldwide flow of information; and global disinflation. 
Likewise, institutions can be designed so as to transmit and amplify the potential 
positive benefits of the various mechanisms through which globalization affects 
poverty, or alternatively, to act as a brake (or, at the most, block) the transmission of 
those effects. 
While there is a widely-held belief that growth reduces the incidence of poverty, a key 
issue is which structure and pattern of growth best contributes to poverty alleviation. 
The resulting distributional effects of globalization are known to produce winners and 
losers, both between and within countries. In particular, the losers (among whom are 
certain categories of poor) are often extremely vulnerable to changes in absolute and 
relative prices of wage goods. This calls for effective complementary policies and 
safety nets to be in place at both national and global levels. 
Our review also raises the issue as to whether the present form of 
globalization/integration is conducive to the growth-cum-structural transformation 
process, which is capable of engendering and sustaining pro-poor economic growth 
and favourable distributional consequences. Contrary to the income convergence 
thesis, it is possible for globalization to generate adverse distributional consequences 
at the national and global levels which could slow down or even reverse the present 
poverty alleviation trend.  
Hence, policymakers need to design and implement an active development strategy 
not only to benefit from, but also to help counteract the negative effects of the 
immutable forces of globalization. Globalization should not be viewed as a reliable 
substitute for a domestic development strategy (Sanchez 2003). It is not enough for 
governments to assume an active role in liberalizing trade and capital movements and 
de-regulating their economies while passively waiting for the fruits of the Washington 
consensus and the market forces of globalization to pull them on a fast track to 
development. Instead, governments need to pursue both active liberalization and 
active domestic development policies.   
In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the remarks by Milanovic, who made a careful 
historical analysis of the most recent period of globalization:  
the last two decades, which witnessed expansion of globalization, are, in 
terms of overall growth and income convergence between poor and rich 
countries, vastly less successful than the preceding two decades The attempt  
28 
to explain divergence of incomes by ‘eliminating’ the countries with ‘bad’ 
policies and focusing solely on those with ‘good’ policies is flawed because 
the successful countries, and China in particular, did not follow the orthodox 
economic advice (Milanovic 2003: 676).  
We have argued particularly for the need for strategic integration: globalization offers 
large potential benefits for the countries that decide to engage strategically and 
actively in the globalization process. But benefits are neither automatic nor 
guaranteed. Only countries that create patterns of comparative advantage towards 
high-skill and high-productive activities will gain significantly from globalization. 
Passive liberalization may lead to marginalization. At the same time, countries which 
have not yet reached the critical threshold, need (i) to invest in agriculture in order to 
reach the takeoff-point to allow the structural transformation of their economies to 
proceed; and (ii) to strengthen institutions of social protection.  
As Kanbur (1998) notes, the central policy dilemma is ‘how to take advantage of the 
undoubted opportunities that integration into the world economy affords for rapid 
growth, while managing the attendant risks for domestic income distribution in its 
different dimensions’. Rodrik (1997) takes a similar position, arguing that while 
globalization is a positive trend, globalization can succeed and be sustained only if 
appropriate domestic measures are undertaken to cushion the impact on groups that 
are adversely affected. Yet, as Tanzi (2001) notes, the unwillingness or inability to tax 
international mobile financial capital in the process of tax competition and in fear of 
capital flight and asset migration, has, among other conditions termed as ‘fiscal 
termites’, contributed greatly to the erosion of the capacity of governments to raise 
revenues for redistributional purposes. 
Others argue the need for alternative, more equitable forms and processes of 
globalization to start with. This requires a much better grasp of the concept of pro-
poor globalization than what we presently hold. Whichever position one takes in this 
policy debate, it is critical to conduct well-focused empirical studies towards 
understanding better the globalization-poverty nexus in a country- or region-specific 
context, since successful policies for maximizing benefits from globalization while 
protecting the poor can only be designed and implemented in such a context.  
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